It has been suggested by psychophysical studies that the judgmental processes of perceptual properties could be explained in terms of the "frames of reference" which have likely been deduced from such phenomena as central tendency, contrast, assimilation, and the like. In social psychology this concept has been employed, along with social norm, standard, value and anchorage, in referring to the attitudeformation.
This concept, however, seems to be short of functional bases relevant to judgmental processes, although it can be used for describing some aspects of phenomena concerning judgments.
For explaining the judgment in general, therefore, another unified concept with a more solid functional basis should be introduced. The theory of the " system of reference " (Metzger, 1954; Morinaga, 1956) , which seems to be in accordance in many aspects with that of the "adaptation-level" (Helson, 1947 (Helson, , 1948 (Helson, , 1951 (Helson, , 1959 , may be used in this concern. A series of experiments has shown that the judgment in perception can be determined in the manner that the stimuli are related to an appropriate system of reference: The judgment may vary with the modification of the system of reference, and such modification may be defined as a systematic shift in reference points, which are estimated on account of the judged category values (Morinaga et al., 1958) .
The theory of the systems of reference is intended to explain the change not only in a perceptual, but also in a social judgment. The authors are consistent with the general assertion that the psychology of perception and judgment could be applied to social phenomena (Berkowitz, 1960; Hovland et al., 1957; Mayzner & Tresselt, 1955; Sherif & Cantril, 1945 Sherif et al., 1958) , and, realizing the importance of judgmental processes in social evaluation situations, they look for the underlying unity of the principles of judgment common to perceptual and social events. Thus the present study is focused upon the judgment of such a complex social issue as the attitude-scale statement, in an attempt to see whether it can be accounted for on the basis of the system of reference.
There have been attempts by several authors to apply the theory of adaptationlevel (AL) to social behaviors Fehrer, 1952; Helson et al., 1956; Rosenbaum, 1956; Segall, 1959) . Helson et al. (1956) concluded that the attitude expressed by the subject will be dependent on the interaction of many factors such as the stimuli being judged, the background opinions, and the residual or the personal factors. They seem to the present authors to be the most ingenious among others in their attempt to attain social evaluations. Their study, however, covered only the situations in which the subject was asked to express his attitude through his agreement with any of the given statements, and had no concern about the judgment which might be obtained on the basis of the favorableness of statements.
The experiments to be reported here have been carried out in order to investigate how social judgments are formed and changed in relation to the above-mentioned three factors mainly under the judgmental situation in which the subject is instructed to judge and express the degree of his favorable feeling toward each statement which is representing an attitude as to war in general.
In Experiment I, the series or context effects such as the order of presentation of the stimulus sentences, the deviation of scale values, and the range of scales were taken account of, and in Experiment II the interacting effects of series stimuli, backgrounds and residuals were examined as to two different evaluations, i.e., under judgmental and attitudinal situations.
EXPERIMENT I Method: Sixty short sentences, stating on war or peace, were collected from various sources. As these statements were various in style and other respects, they were carefully revised and unified grammatically. Then the attitude-scale values and Q values (interquartile range) of these statements were determined by the method of equal-appearing intervals in terms of an eleven-category scale, ranging from the militaristic extreme to the pacifistic extreme. In this procedure about seventy college students in Chiba University served as judges.
Out of these 60 statements 28 were selected as stimulus sentences on the basis of the Thurstone and Chave (1929) criterion : The scale values were rather equally spaced on the dimension of favorableness, with relatively small Q-values. (Hereafter, these scale values assigned by the judges will be referred to as stimulus scale values.)
Thirty college students also in Chiba University, who were not judges, were employed as subjects (Ss). Each of the Ss was instructed to express the degree of his favorableness for or against each stimulus sentence according to a nine-category scale ranging from the most favorable (Category 1), through neutral (Category 5), to the most unfavorable (Category 9). (Henceforth, the category values assigned by the Ss will be designated as judgment scale values, or, abbreviated as JSVs.)
The results obtained will be analysed in terms of shifts both in JSVs and stimulus scale values to which the Ss have given respective judgment categories. These two indices will be represented by the medians. The results will be described with particular procedures in three parts which respectively deal with (a) the order of presenting sentences, (b) the scale deviation, and (c) the scale range.
Exp. I (a) Order of Presentation Procedure : The stimulus sentences, as shown in Table 1 , were printed on cards (4 x 18 cm) which were piled in any of the three different orders of presentation : (i) from the most favorable downward, through neutral, to the most unfavorable (fay. to unfay.), i.e., increasing in scale values, (ii) reverse (unfay. to fay.), and (iii) random. A covering sheet on top of each pile showed instructions. The Ss were divided into three groups (10 Ss each) according to the above orders. They were asked to make judgment and express it every time as they read a sentence, and are told that they need not necessarily to use all of the category numbers, but they may use any of them repeatedly.
Results: The results are shown in Table  2 . The order fay. to unfay. was apt to give the mean of median JSVs for all the 18 sentences higher than that given by the order unfay. to fay. If these sentences were classified into three types, the favorable, neutral, and unfavorable, it was in the last type that JSVs differed most remarkably between different orders, while such difference was smallest in the first type.
In order to inspect this ordinal effect from another aspect, i. e., in terms of stimulus values of the sentences to which the Ss gave respective categories, an analysis in terms of reference points was employed : Median stimulus scale value corresponding Table  1 Stimulus sentences with scale values, determined by the method of equal appearing intervals* * These sentences were employed in Exp. I (a) and Exp. II. Other sentences were also included in Exp. I (b) and (c). From these results will be known the However, this shifting effect was not uniform among sentence types but it decreased with the increase of favorableness of the sentence type. Some factors other than the order of presentation might be operative in judgmental processes. Tentatively we may point out the implicit attitude which the Ss have been used to hold. Really most of them were anti-militaristic. As the system of reference could not be changed with the Ss attitudes against war, the militaristic sentences far from the neutral point would elicit always lower categories. It is also evident that the judgment of each stimulus depends not only upon its own stimulus value but also upon values of other stimuli, so that it will readily be changed if other stimuli be given in a different order.
Exp. I (b) Scale Deviation
Procedure : In order to examine the effect of deviation in scale values, the following three scales were prepared : (i) C-scale, or the control scale, with sentences ranging from the favorable extreme to the unfavorable extreme (scale values 1.3-10.8), (ii) M-scale, deviated to a more favorable range (scale values 1.3-8.4), and (iii) P-scale, deviated to a more unfavorable (scale values 3.1-10.8).
Twenty-four sentences, including those used in Exp. I (a), were presented in random orders. The Ss were instructed to express the degree of favorableness of these sentences after they read all the sentences throughout. Other procedures were similar to those in Exp. I (a).
Results: The results, in terms of JSVs, are summarized in Table 3 . Mean of ,JSVs for 12 sentences which are common in all the three scales were 4.93 in M-, 4.63 in C-, and 4.62 in P-scale. Mean ,JS Vs for 18 sentences common to M-and C-scales were 3.98 in M-and 3.68 in Cscale, while those for 18 common sentences of P-and C-scales were 5.87 and 5.81 in the respective scales. Now the 24 sentences were divided into 8 sections, in the manner that any two scales had some sections in common, and ,JSV for each section was computed in each scale. It was found that the JSVs of the common sections were always higher in M-scale than in C-scale. On the other hand, the sections common to C-and Pscales appeared different. Within the scale value range 3.1 to 3.7 the JSVs in C-scale were higher than those in P-scale, while outside this range they were lower in C-scale than in P-scale.
It is seen in these results that the same sentences in different scales are differently judged, in spite of their same stimulus values: The sentences in M-scale are judg- ed as less favorable than those in P-scale, but those in C-scale are not always judged as intermediate of those of M-and Pscales.
Here again, median stimulus scale values for three reference points were computed, as shown in Fig. 2 . The location of the reference points markedly differed between M-and P-scales; i.e., all the three reference points in M-scale were located on lower stimulus values than in P-scale. However, the neutral points were less shifted as compared with other reference points. The positive reference point in M-scale was extraordinarily lowered beyond the neutral point, but this result may supposedly involve an error due to some careless mistakes of Ss.
The fact that the judgment varied with scale deviation cannot simply be ascribed to the shift in the neutral point, because there are seen some irregularities in shifts in reference points.
Exp. I (c) Scale Range
Following the above finding that the judgment of a given sentence depends more or less upon other sentences given in the same series, it was questioned whether the same sentences would be judged differently if the width of a scale was changed.
Procedure : Two kinds of scales were prepared : (i) W-scale (wide range) was identical with the C-scale in the previous experiment and contained 24 sentences which ranged from 1.3-10.8 in scale values and (ii) N-scale (narrow range) contained 12 sentences ranging from 3.1 to 8.4. In either scales all the sentences were presented in random orders. Other procedures were the same as in Exp. I (a).
Results: The results are shown in Table  4 (A). The 12 sentences, which were commonly given in either scales, were classified into four sections, I, II, III, and IV, according to their scale values from low to high, and their respective JSVs were computed. Mean JSVs of the sentences in the regions 3.1 to 3.7 and also 7.4 to 8.4 were lower in N-scale than in W-scale. However, comparison of individual sentences showed a little different aspect: each of more favorable sentences gave a lower JSV in N-scale than in Wscale, while more unfavorable sentences showed a reverse relation. It is noticed that this was true even where each sentence was presented independently so that the Table 4 Comparison of median JSVs of the 12 common sentences, on scales W and N, under two different instructions * A stands for the instruction that Ss should make judgment and express it every time as they read every sentence in each card. * * B stands for the instruction that Ss should make judgment and express it after they have read all the sentences throughout.
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K. NOGUCHI AND A. OHISHI Table  5 Comparison of median stimulus value, i. e., reference points Fig. 3 . Shifts in reference points due to the effect of the scale range under two different instructions.
Ss were not knowing how many sentences they ought to judge.
Another experiment was carried out to see whether a similar result could be obtained when Ss were allowed to read in advance all the sentences throughout. They were printed on a single card, either of N-or W-scale, and were presented to five Ss, graduate students in Tokyo Metropolitan University, in either order, i.e., N-scale first or W-scale first. Other conditions were the same as those in the previous experiment.
The results are shown in Table 4 (B). The sentences with scale values 3.1 to 3.7 gave lower JSVs in N-scale than in W-scale, while those with scale values 7.4 to 8.4 gave higher JSVs in N-scale than in W-scale.
It was seen in both cases (A and B) that the difference of JSVs between I and IV was larger in N-scale than in W-scale.
As for the median stimulus scale values, as shown in Table 5 and Fig. 3 , it was found that the positive reference points were lower in N-scale than in W-scale, the negative reference points were lower in W-scale than in N-scale, and the neutral points were a little lower in W-scale than in N-scale. This means that the gradient of shift inJSVs was steeper in N-scale than in W-scale and accordingly the distance between reference points was shorter in the former than in the latter. Furthermore, the fact that the judgment was determined not only by the neutral point or AL but also by positive or negative reference point, in the system of reference, suggests that the judgment in terms of AL measure can be predicted only limitedly.
Thus far it has been elucidated that each individual stimulus will not always be judged independently, for it will have a system effect on other stimuli which, on the other hand, will certainly affect the judgment of it.
In the following section (Experiment II) it will be investigated how the system of reference be affected by other variables such as background and residual or personal factors.
EXPERIMENT II
Method : This experiment was designed to examine whether evaluation (including both judgment and expressed attitude) of sentences as to war and peace be affected by opinions of other people (background Ss), and to find out interrelationship of sentence type, background type, and personal characteristics (residuals). The experiment was carried out under either alone or simulated group conditions*, and also under either of two different situations, i.e., (a) "judgmental situation" wherein the Ss had to express the degree of their favorableness or unfavorableness as regards each of the given sentences, and (b) "attitudinal situation" wherein they had to express the degree of their own agreement or disagreement with these sentences.
The basic procedure was generally like that of Helson et al. (1956) *.
Three sets of experimental variables were as follows:
Stimulus Sentences. The stimulus sentences were the same as those used in Exp. I (a) including three sentence types, 6 pro-militaristic, 6 moderate, and 6 anti-militaristic. (Tsujioka et al., 1957) was used to determine personal characteristics of the Ss who were also college students in Chiba University. Of these, 45 Ss were selected and classified into three groups ; 15 ascendant, 15 average, and 15 submissive, according to their scores in this inventory; i.e., 0-6 (ascendant), 9-15 (average), and 17-20 (submissive) . Table 6 , from combinations of sentence types, backgrounds and residuals which were in three degrees respectively. The results obtained from 24 Ss, who were also employed in the experiment under the attitudinal situation are summarized in Table 7 . This shows comparison of jSVs under alone condition (left row in each cell) and simulated group condition (right * There were some differences in procedure, among which the most important was the treatment of data concerning background effects. While Helson et al. inspected were not considered, the amount of shift in judgment was most prominent for neutral sentences, and no difference was seen between the favorable and unfavorable sentences in this regard. Background Opinions. Variances associated with difference of background opinions were smallest on the neutral background. Without considering the variances from sentence types or A-S categories, the obtained F of 4.64 for difference among background types was significant at the level of 0.05. The amount of shift in judgment was much with either favorable or unfavorable backgrounds. Hence it seems that individual judgment can markedly be influenced by both positive and negative social backgrounds.
A-S Types. Variances associated with differences among A-S types, as shown at the bottom of the right row in Table 7 , were the least in the ascendant Ss.
Stimulus-Background Interaction. JSVs for all types of sentences were higher on unfavorable background than on favorable background. ,JSVs for neutral and favorable sentences with neutral background were intermediate of those with unfavorable and favorable backgrounds. The obtained F of 4.87 for the variance from interaction of three types of sentences and three types of backgrounds was significant at the level of 0.01.
The amount of shift in judgment under both conditions were less in the case where sentence type was consistent with background type than in the case where it was not (although no such relation could be found with neutral background). In the latter case the amount of shift in JSVs of unfavorable sentences with favorable background was much larger than that of favorable sentences with unfavorable background. This seems to be related to the Ss' attitude toward war. When the favorable background was given for the sentences which the Ss thought less favorable at first, the anti-militaristic Ss would tend to modify their judgment more markedly than in any other cases.
Background-A-S Type Interaction. With any type of background the amount of shift was the least in the ascendant Ss. From this fact it is evident that the ascendant Ss would be less influenced by social context than the submissive Ss would be.
Stimulus-Background-A-S Type Interaction. In 8 of 9 cells formed by combinations of Table 9 Change of judgment toward background opinions sentence contents and backgrounds, the amount of shift in submissive Ss was more prominent than that in ascendant Ss. When the types of sentence and background were contradictory, the submissive Ss would be more liable to change their judgment than the ascendant Ss are.
Tables 9, 10 and 11 summarize the frequency and amount of shift, scoring the shift toward background in plus numbers and scoring the opposite shift in minus numbers. These scorings were taken for only 12 sentences either with favorable or unfavorable backgrounds. Inspecting the frequency of shift, it was found that the judgment was shifted toward background at least once in each of 39 Ss under alone condition, while it was shifted away from background at least once in 33 Ss. On the other hand, inspection of the mean amount of shift shows that the shift toward background was largest, and that away from background was smallest, in the average Ss.
From these indices it is seen that the Ss had their judgment shifted, more or less, toward background opinions, and that the more frequenctly the Ss responded to the influence of background, the more was the amount of shift toward or away from it.
Exp. II (b) Attitudinal Situation
The previous results (Exp. II-a) show that the stimulus sentences, background opinions, and personal factors interact and affect the social evaluation, and also that the individual judgment is influenced in a systematic manner by opinions of other persons. Now we shall compare such judgments with the attitudes as expressed toward war.
The experimental procedures followed those previously described, except for the conditions as below. All the Ss, together in a class room, were instructed to express the extent of their own agreement with the given sentences, according to a ninecategory scale ranging from the most strongly disagreeable (Category 1), through neutral (Category 5), to the most greatly agreeable (Category 9).
Results: The data were treated as in Exp. II (a), though the mean category values were designated as attitude scale values (ASVs) in place of 3SVs. The results are summarized in Table 12 in which ASVs under alone condition (left row) were compared with ASVs under simulated group condition (right row). In the middle row in the table are the absolute values of differences between both conditions. The analysis of variance of these results is shown in Table 13 .
Stimulus Sentences. If the variance of background or A-S type was neglected, the amount of shift in the expressed attitude was most prominent with the neutral sentences. The bottom row of Table 12 shows that the Ss more agreed with the unfavorable (pacifistic) sentences than with System of Reference in Social Judgment 81 Table 12  Comparison of attitude scale values of alone (left row) and simulated group (right row) conditions other types of sentences. Background Opinions. Without considering other factors, the amount of shift in the expressed attitude was smallest with the neutral background, and there was no difference between agreeing and disagreeing backgrounds.
It follows that the individual response seems to be affected either by positive or negative social backgrounds. A-S Types. The amount of shift associated with differences among A-S types was smallest in the ascendant Ss than in any of other personal types.
Stimulus-Background Interaction. AS Vs for the favorable and unfavorable sentences with three types of background decreased with the decrease of agreement of background type. The amount of shift was smaller when favorable (or unfavorable) sentences were acompanied by disagreeing (or agreeing) background than when favorable (or unfavorable) sentences were given on an agreeing (or disagreeing) background; i. e., when there is no contradiction between background opinion and individual attitude, the Ss in alone condition would less tend to change their expressions.
Background-A-S Type Interaction. With any type of background the ascendant Ss showed always smaller amounts of shift Table  15 Change of attitude away from background opinions Tables  14 and 15 , for the 12 sentences with agreeing and disagreeing backgrounds, all of 24 Ss at least once changed their attitude, which they expressed under alone condition, toward background, and 21 of them changed at least once their attitude away from background. The more frequently the Ss changed their attitude, the larger was the amount of shift in each attitude. Moreover, the shifts toward background were greater than those away from background. This seems to be a positive aspect of the background effects.
The results as to A-S categories are shown in Table 16 . It was found that the mean amount of shift toward background was largest in average Ss, while the shift away from background was largest in submissive Ss. In either cases the smallest amount of shift was seen in ascendant Ss. This result differed from those by Helson et al. (1956) that the shift away from background was greater in ascendant Ss than in submissive and average ones while the shift toward background was greater in submissive than in other types of Ss. Presumably this difference can be attributed to the difference in the measure of residual, i. e., the difference between the Allport A-S Reaction Study and the Yatabe-Guilford Personality Inventory , and also to the difference between the ranges of stimulus sentences employed in their and our experiments.
DISCUSSION
The main results obtained in both experiments (Exp. I and II) will be discussed with reference to other studies concerning social judgment and attitude , also with respect to methodology.
Consistent with the prediction based on the theories of the adaptation-level and the system of reference, it appeared through Exp. I that judgment of a given stimulus will not only be determined by itself but also by the remaining stimuli in the series.
In Exp. I (a) it was evident that the judgment scale values varied with the order of presentation and they also depended upon the Ss' general attitude toward war, i. e., their being strongly disagreeable with war, or anti-militaristic. This contradicts with the assumption by Thurstone and Chave (1929) that the scale values of statements are independent of the attitudes of the judges who do the sorting. Along with attempts to disprove this assumption (Edwards et al., 1946; Hovland & Sherif, 1952; Sherif & Hovland, 1953) , we should recognize that attitudes of judges or Ss affect the scale values, so far as any specific criterion is not used, or, so far as the method of single stimuli is employed (Hovland & Sherif, 1952; Kelley et al., 1955) . Segall (1959) demonstrated the effects of attitude and item order on judgments of controversial statements and he obtained, with regards to extremity judgments, as in our Exp. I (a), the result that more effective was not the Ss' attitude but the item order; i. e., there was no positive correlation between judgment and attitude. This result, however, as Segall pointed out for himself, seemed to be due to the condition in which the Ss' attitude toward the issue of fraternity was not so widely ranged as in the attitude toward the Negro which was the issue in the works of Thurstone, Hovland and others. Fehrer (1952) reported that the judgment of stimulus items with the same scale values significantly differed with the composition of the Thurstone-Chave Attitude toward War Scale, i.e., with the deviation in scale values as shown in the present paper (Exp. I-b), but she discovered that the shifts in scale values were limited to the items whose scale values were near to the truncated ends of scales, and that the items judged neutral were not shifted. Her interpretation was that these shifts, which seemingly contradict the theory of adaptation-level, cannot be attributed to shifts in AL, but they may be attributed to such residual factors as certain previous incidental experiences and some semantic relations between the items and the judgment categories. The present results in Exp. I (b) also showed that the items judged to be close to neutral (scale values 5.7-7.1) maintained almost the same, although it was not clear which item would tend to shift more markedly. Rather less shifts in judgments of all the items throughout seem to be due to the large overlaps of items in scales.
Exp. I (c) showed that the judgment also differed with the width of the range of scales; the distances between reference points were shorter in a narrow range scale than in a wide range scale. From this fact it seems difficult to define psychological properties or behavioral field exclusively by means of a neutral point or AL value. Instead they may be defined also by taking other (positive and negative) reference points, i.e., in terms of the whole system of reference in question.
In addition to this, it is needed for the opinion-attitude methodology that these contextual effects, which are shown in Exp. I throughout, be considered.
In Exp. II the authors attempted to examine the social judgment as well as the expressed attitude by means of deliberately combined variables of focal stimuli, background and residual factors. There the Ss responded to the same sentences under the judgmental and attitudinal situations. The results obtained in both situations showed almost identical tendencies. This suggests that a same judgmental process may be underlying both expressions of favorableness and agreement.
There were certain peculiarities in the results of Exp. II. It has been known that, if a neutral point or AL shifts in any direction on a continuum of stimuli, the stimuli near the neutral point or AL are most affected by the shift (Helson, 1951 (Helson, , 1959 Metzger, 1954; Morinaga, 1956) . Accordingly, neutral sentences on a con- Table 18 Median judgment scale values corresponding to three sentence types tinuum widely extending from the most favorable to the most unfavorable would markedly be shifted, whereas the extreme sentences slightly be affected. This holds good in the present results in terms of JSVs (or AS Vs). However, susceptibility of the neutral point seemed uncertain as considered in terms of reference points, as shown by median stimulus values in Table  17 .
This contradiction should be examined by a more deliberate analysis. In discovering how to modify the frame of reference, it may be represented as a systematic change in judgment categories or as a systematic change in stimulus values (Salzinger, 1956) . Both representations have to coincide with each other because they inspect the change in a given phenomenon. However, in the case of inspection of change in judgment categories (JSVs), the neutral sentences were most changeable. On the other hand, the inspection of changes in stimulus values showed only a slight shift in the neutral reference point. This paradoxical result might be due to the difference in, computation; between mean JSVs and median stimulus values. In order to compare them on a common scale, the respective medians in JSVs were computed (Table  18 ). Even then, however, the JSVs for the neutral sentences were found to be more changeable than the extreme ones. What, then, could be a cause? While there was no shift in the stimulus values which were judged neutral (elicited Categories 4-6), some shifts were found in the judgment scale values for the sentences with stimulus values 4.6-7.1. Such a discrepancy might be due to the psychological distance between Categories 4-6 not being corresponded with the distance of stimulus values between 4.6-7.1. If the stimulus scale values in neutral sentence were determined more evenly, the paradox as above might have been avoided.
When an individual is instructed to respond to a specific stimulation during, or soon after, other stimuli are issued, the latter may be regarded as background stimuli with respect to the focal stimuli (Helson et al., 1956 ), although it is not always easy to draw a strict distinction between stimuli as such and background. The background stimuli used in this experiment were the verbal expressions, recorded on tape, of four other persons, Dotted circles refer to `contrast' phenomena.
given after the focal stimuli. These background stimuli could not produce a real group atmosphere, for the Ss could readily see the tape-corder manipulation. It was evident to the Ss that the background was indeed devised experimentally. It is noticeable that even in such a situation the Ss can be subjected to the influence of background.
As to the congruency or incongruency of sentence type with background, we may refer to the experiments by Hovland et al. (1957) and Sherif et al. (1958) . They illustrated the relevance of contrast and assimilation in social behaviors: when the difference between an individual's own stand and background reports was smaller, the reports were received more favorable and perceived to be closer to his stand than actually they were (i.e., there occurred an assimilation). If, on the other hand, the background reports were more different from the Ss' stand, they were taken as propagandistic or unfair and were perceived as to be more distant from his stand than were actually (i. e., there was seen the contrast or boomerang effect).
To apply this illustration to the present results, 6 favorable and 6 unfavorable sentences were combined with three background types, and the respective median scale values were plotted as in Fig. 4 . Inspection of this figure shows that in both judgmental and attitudinal situations there appears an assimilation, a shift toward background, in almost every combination, though there were a few exceptional contrast phenomena resulting in a shift away from background. But it seems to the authors that these phenomena of assimilation and contrast should not simply be correlated with the distance between the background and the Ss' stand, for an assimilation can also be seen where there is some discrepancy between sentence and background.
In such a situation as to carry out social evaluations of attitude-scale sentences, the system of reference may not be formed only in stimulus sentences. According to Asch (1952) , and Blake et al. (1957) , such a situation may considerably be short of factual anchorage or structuredness by which the system of reference, as a rule, is deter-mined. Thus an individual evaluation may significantly be affected by background opinions, especially when they are unanimous. An evaluation is usually moved toward background, more markedly toward either more positive or more negative backgrounds.
On the other hand, if the implicit attitude is fixed strongly (as was the case with our Ss' strong disagreement with war, their being anti-militaristic), the shift will be checked or be away from background.
It should be noticed, moreover, that the background effects are not always uniform, as has been shown by the significant interaction between stimulus sentence and background.
In regard to the Ss' personal types, A-S Categories, we cannot say much as far as the present study is concerned. However, it may be worth to say that the degree of ascendancy is not related to militarismpacificism dimension and that submissive Ss are more susceptible to the background than the ascendant ones, and that the most susceptible are the average Ss. The very last comment contradicts with the result by Helson et al. (1956) , and it should further he ascertained in future. Now let us consider the formation and change of the opinion-attitude as to their relation to the so-called frame of reference which, however, seems to be still ambiguously defined. The problem of how the individual responses be influenced by group or background situations has been investigated by a number of social psychologists. Sherif and Cantril (1945, 1946) , among others, stated that an individual response is relatively constant when the objective stimulus situation is so well-structured that the frame or the scale that is underlying the judgment be stable. On the other hand, they continued, when the stimulus situation is so ambiguous that a new frame should be made out, the subjects are more influenced by internal (traits, motive) and external (suggestion, prestige) social factors. This proposition was verified by Sherif (1952) in his ingenious experiment on the autokinesis phenomenon. Along with this line, Asch (1952) demonstrated that an individual judgment of a length of line could be disturbed by different judgments by other persons, and he concluded: Whether the individual may keep or change his judgment depends on the three major characters of the stimulus situation, group force, and individual. For example, with diminishing clarity of the stimulus condition the majority effect increases, and individuals are highly sensitive to unanimity of group forces. This seemed to coincide with the report by Sherif (1953) that attitudes were formed and changed with the relation of membership to reference group. As to the resistance with change in attitude, Newcomb (1950) insisted that an individual will not change his attitude concerning the matter of ego-involvement or self-defense because of stability of his frame of reference. Blake, Helson, and Mouton (1957) showed that the conformity behavior* was understood as a function of factual anchorage, difficulty of task, and amount of social pressure: Conformity was more frequently observed with difficult items than with easy ones; it was more often with the smaller difference between the modal response and background opinion than with larger difference. In conclusion, conformity behavior was determined by both situational and personal factors. Moreover, Blake et al. found that the expression of attitude toward war was much more influenced by background opinions than by other tasks such as reporting the count of metronome clicks or computing arithmetical numbers. This finding, they considered, may not be ascribed to the factual anchorage of the expression of attitude. These studies, considered all together, suggest that the social judgment or attitude cannot be explained one-sidely by either external or internal factors. Thus the authors support the assertion by Helson (1959) that the social judgment must operationally be investigated and be understood as an adjustment to external factors such as focal stimuli and backgrounds and to personal factors or residuals.
However, above-referred studies seem to have not been able to make clear the definition of frame of reference, though the attempt to define the frame in terms of AL may be regarded successful. This attempt seems to the authors to be rather progressive as it make simple the representation of judgment, but it has some limitations in predicting whole changes in the frame of reference (in our term, system of reference) because of the over-simplification. On the contrary, our attempt to define in terms of reference points has no restriction in this regard and will succeed in evaluating whole changes in the system of reference if the technique for representing reference points is more examined.
SUMMARY
Experiments were carried out in an attempt to find out whether the theory of systems of reference could be applied for explaining social evaluations : The contextual effects such as the item order, scale deviation, and scale range were examined (Exp. I), and it was also investigated how series stimuli, backgrounds and residual factors would influence social judgment of a subject under either alone or simulated group conditions (Exp. II).
The scale values of stimulus sentences, representing attitudes toward war, were determined by the method of equal-appearing intervals. The Ss among college students in Chiba University were asked to express the degree of favorableness for the sentences (Exp. I, Exp. II-a) or to express the degree of agreement with them (Exp. II-b), according to a nine-category scale.
1) The mean category score was largest when the favorable sentence was given first, least when the favorable was given last; it was in between when they were presented in a random order: (fay. to unfay.)> (random)> (unfay. to fay.).
2) It also varied with the range of scale values: (i) Higher category scores were obtained from the sentences deviated to more favorable scale values, and lower ones from those deviated to a more unfavorable range. (ii) The distance between the assigned categories was shorter in a narrowrange scale than in wider.
3) The mean category score, which expressed the extent of favorableness or agreement, was different with conditions -alone or simulated group. (1) In either conditions the amount of shift in evaluation was most prominent for neutral sentences.
(ii) It was smaller in neutral background than in any other. (iii) In all cases the amount of shift was greater in submissive Ss than in ascendant Ss. (iv) The amount of shift was larger when the background type coincided with the sentence type, and smaller when the types were contradictory (except for the neutral sentence with neutral background). (v) The Ss had their evaluations, more or less, shifted toward background opinions, and the more frequently the Ss responded to the background influences, the more was the amount of shift toward or away from background.
The analysis of the results in terms of the modification of system of reference was found to be applicable for inspecting the judgment changes in the whole range, and it revealed some difficulties in the prediction according to a single AL value.
This study suggests that the social behavior in general could be investigated in view of the systems of reference.
